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The intention-superiority effect is the finding that response latencies are faster for items related
to an uncompleted intention as compared with materials that have no associated intentionality.
T. Goschke and J. Kuhl (1993) used recognition latency for simple action scripts to document
this effect. We used a lexical-decision task to replicate that shorter latencies were associated
with uncompleted intentions as compared with neutral materials (Experiments 1 and 3).
Experiments 2-4, however, demonstrated that latencies were longer for completed scripts as
compared with neutral materials. In Experiment 4, shorter latencies were also obtained for
partially completed scripts. The results are discussed in terms of the activation and inhibition
that may guide behavior, as well as how these results may inform theories of prospective
memory.
Prospective memory is a complex form of human memory
that functions in service of completing temporarily post-
poned intentions. Published research reports on the topic are
not numerous, but the field is growing (cf. Roediger, 1996).
One distinction that is often made in this literature is
between memory for what one has to accomplish versus
memory that one has an intention at all. The two types of
information are dissociable and have been loosely termed
the "retrospective" and the "prospective" components to
prospective remembering, respectively (e.g., Baddeley &
Wilkins, 1984; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Some theorists
have referred to this distinction as memory for content
versus memory for intent (e.g., Kvavilashvili, 1987). By and
large, most of the work in this area has been directed at the
prospective component of this form of memory. Very little
research has been devoted to investigating the nature of the
retrospective representation, or memory for the intention
itself (cf. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). This article addresses the
question of whether the dynamic properties (i.e., level of
activation) of an established intention change as a function
of the intention's status as either fulfilled or unfulfilled.
Recently, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) reported a series of
studies that suggested that the stored representation of an
intention may have privileged status in memory as compared
with other information. According to this view, the mental
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representation of an intention is stored in declarative memory,
just as other types of memories are. Declarative intentions
may exist, however, at a heightened level of activation, or
they may at least be more readily revived than other
memories. In Goschke and Kuhl's paradigm, people learned
pairs of small, scripted actions such as clearing a messy
desk. After a pair of scripts had been learned, people were
told that they would have to perform one of the two scripts,
or they were told that they would have to observe the
experimenter perform one of the two scripts. These instruc-
tions turned one script into a prospective script (either to
perform or to observe), and the remaining script of the pan-
was made a neutral script. As such, no intention to perform
or to observe was associated with the neutral script.
All participants learned two pairs of scripts (i.e., four
scripts total) and were tested in both of the observe and the
perform conditions. The instruction as to which script was to
be performed (or observed) was quite brief, was delivered
after the script pair had been learned, and was followed
immediately by a recognition test for all of the items
contained in the pair of scripts. In four experiments,
Goschke and Kuhl (1993) found that participants were faster
and more accurate with items from scripts that were to be
performed later by the participant as compared with items
from the neutral scripts that had been paired with them.
Thus, establishing the intention to perform an activity (i.e.,
now having prospective memory for the activity) appeared
to heighten the activation of that declarative representation
in memory. In contrast, prospective memory for observing
the experimenter perform an activity did not result in any
such heightened activation relative to a neutral script.
By applying the standard assumption that latency and
activation are inversely related (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Rat-
cliff & McKoon, 1978), the results were theoretically
interpreted as evidence for persisting activation related to
the formation of an intention. As Goschke and Kuhl (1993)
noted, these results are consistent with Anderson's (1983)
ACT* (adaptive control of thought) model of memory in
which goal nodes are portrayed as possessing large and
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constant amounts of activation. These same hypothesized
goal nodes are the only elements of working memory in
ACT* that do not need rehearsal to sustain activation. This
last point is nontrivial because one obvious alternative
explanation is that on receiving the prospective instruction
that a particular script will have to be performed, people
rehearse or otherwise strategically change their mental
representation of the to-be-performed activity.
Goschke and Kuhl (1993) ruled out this counterexplana-
tion in multiple ways. For example, as a rehearsal manipula-
tion in their fourth experiment, they had people selectively
imagine themselves performing both the prospective activity
and the neutral script with which it was paired. They also
had a blocking condition in which people performed Brooks's
(1969) spatial-interference task to prevent rehearsal. In both
conditions, an intention-superiority effect was obtained in
which recognition latency was faster for "prospective-
perform scripts" (as they are called in this article) than for
neutral scripts. Goschke and Kuhl ruled out a number of
other alternative explanations as well (for a synopsis, see
Goschke & Kuhl, 1996, p. 64). Because the instruction was a
postlearning manipulation, selective encoding strategies
could not have been the antecedent of the effect. The
semantic relatedness (or lack thereof) of the target script to
the neutral script also does not account for the effect. In
addition, people receiving the prospective-perform instruc-
tion neither interpreted that as necessary to preparing for a
free-recall test, nor interpreted the observe instruction as
necessary to preparing for a recognition test in which the
experimenter is watched for errors. People who were
specifically told that they would receive a free-recall test on
both scripts in a pair nevertheless displayed the intention-
superiority effect.
The interpretation of the intention-superiority effect in
terms of Anderson's (1983) ACT* network model of memory
(and its depiction of spreading activation) has received some
additional empirical support. Mantyla (1993) has found that
priming a prospective response increased later prospective
remembering. In his general paradigm, people were engaged
first in a fluency task, such as generating semantic associates
for two categories. When later engaged in a task that
required generation of a first associate, people were in-
structed to mark an X whenever they encountered a word
from one of four specific semantic categories, two of which
had been primed in the fluency task. Prospective responding
was better to the targets of the primed categories than the
unprimed categories. Mantyla (1996) reported additional
experiments along slightly different lines that were consis-
tent with the priming of a prospective response. These
priming results and their spread-of-activation interpretation
are conceptually similar to Yaniv and Meyer's (1987)
finding that inaccessible information in a tip-of-the-tongue
paradigm received quicker judgments in a lexical-decision
task than did control information (cf. Connor, Balota, &
Neely, 1992). Likewise, as McNamara (1992) has argued, no
existing theory does a better job in explaining such diverse
empirical findings than Anderson's network model.
In none of the reports just reviewed did the theorists claim
that successful prospective remembering was a direct conse-
quence of the heightened activation associated with an
intention. Rather, all noted that many other important factors
exist that affect prospective memory. Rather than review
those additional factors here (see Ellis, 1996, for a review),
the purpose of this article was to explore the generality of the
intention-superiority effect. To provide convergent evidence
that intended activities reside in memory with some special
status, we decided to use a lexical-decision task (hereinafter
LDT) rather than recognition latencies. Our intuition was
that a performance measure such as latency in an LDT is a
more indirect measure of memory, in contrast to the direct
measure of recognition. If activation is the underlying
construct being measured, then one of the best measurement
tasks is lexical decision (see Marsh & Landau, 1995, for one
discussion of these issues). We also felt that with the
generally excellent performance in lexical decision, greater
data yield might result in more stable estimates of activation
as compared with recognition.
In Experiment 1, we replicated the intention-superiority
paradigm, replacing the recognition measure of activation
with one of lexical decision. In Experiments 2-4, we
explored some straightforward theoretical predictions about
the consequences of heightened activation of an intention.
For example, if the intention-superiority effect reflects both
activation and inhibition, then a completed activity might be
expected to exhibit inhibition relative to more neutral
memories. This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 2. The
design of Experiment 3 served as a conceptual replication of
Experiments 1 and 2 and further addressed how activation
was allocated to a set of memories that contained both
intentions and nonintentions. We designed Experiments 1-3
to address completed and uncompleted intentions, whereas
Experiment 4 was designed to explore the level of activation
of an interrupted activity.
Experiment 1
The primary motivation for this experiment was to assess
whether an intention-superiority effect could be obtained
using lexical-decision latency. Because the assessment of
activation preceded the participants' completion of the
intentions, latency was predicted to be shorter for materials
contained in the prospective-perform script as compared
with more neutral materials (i.e., the script that was not
going to be performed). Although we added a final recogni-
tion task at the end of this experiment, no a priori prediction
was made about these latencies other than that completing
the activities may have equated the activation among the
tasks and conditions tested. Our logic was that if the results
were positive with the convergent measure of activation
inferred from lexical decision, then lexical decision could
also be used to assess the net effect on activation of other
manipulations of interest in Experiments 2—4.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates from the University
of Georgia volunteered in exchange for partial fulfillment of a
course research requirement. As noted in the Procedure section, 3352 MARSH, HICKS, AND BINK
additional people were tested as replacements. An additional group
of 24 undergraduates was tested in a control condition as reported
in the Recognition subsection of the Results and Discussion
section. Participants were tested individually in sessions that lasted
approximately 40 min.
Materials. Following Goschke and Kuril's (1993) procedure,
two scripts consisting of simple action phrases were constructed for
each of the two study phases (i.e., blocks) of the experiment, for a
total of four scripts. These scripts comprised a title (e.g., Brewing
Coffee) and five sequential action phrases (e.g., insert the filter,
pour the water, etc.). The scripts were distinct and held no semantic
relationship to one another. Complete counterbalancing ensured
that each script appeared equally often in the prospective-perform
and prospective-observe conditions, and as a neutral script paired
with each of those two prospective conditions. Each of the two
LDTs comprised three classes of items. First, we included the 20
script words from the two studied scripts; these were the 5 verbs
and 5 nouns from the action phrases in the scripts (e.g., insert, filter,
pour, etc.). Second, we also included 20 neutral but valid English
words (hereinafter called "nonscript words") that did not appear in
the experiment. Third, we included 40 pronounceable nonwords
matched for syllabic length to the script and nonscript words, such
that the probability of positive and negative responses in the LDT
was 50% each.
The rationale for including nonscript words that did not appear in
the experiment was threefold. First, their inclusion allowed a test of
the obvious prediction that script words, having been learned
earlier, should possess more activation than nonscript words.
Second, inclusion of the nonscript words ensured that not all
positive responses in the LDT were a function of prior learning of
the scripts. Third, a recognition memory test identical to Goschke
and Kuril's (1993) dependent measure was included at the end of
this experiment. These nonscript words served as the lures in that
test, and including them in the LDT controlled for prior exposure in
the LDT. Thus, each word in the recognition test had been
encountered during lexical decision. Each script word was yoked
with 1 of the nonscript words to match word frequency (Kudera &
Francis, 1967) and syllabic length. In each LDT, 12 buffer items for
practice (6 words and 6 nonwords) preceded the 80 critical items in
the test sequence. Complete randomization of the test items was
under software control, with the specific items on the LDT wholly
specified by which two scripts were being tested. The final
recognition test was constructed by randomizing anew all of the
valid English words from both LDTs (i.e., all 40 script words as
targets and all 40 nonscript words as lures for a total recognition
test of 80 items).
Procedure. Procedurally, the experimental sequence was al-
most identical to Goschke and Kuhl's (1993). Participants were
told that they would have to leam two pairs of scripted actions in
each of two separate blocks of the experiment for a later memory
test. In one of the blocks, they were told that they would actually
have to perform one of the two scripts. In the other block, they were
told that they would have to observe the experimenter perform one
of the two scripts. In the latter case, people were told they would
have to verify that the experimenter had performed the correct
sequence of actions. As such, two scripts, one in each block, were
not performed at all (i.e., they were the neutral scripts). Half of the
participants were given instructions to observe in the first block and
to perform in the second block, whereas the other half received
instructions to perform in the reverse order.
1 Participants were
additionally instructed that they would perform a counting-
backward task immediately after script learning and that they
would make lexical decisions just before script execution (or script
observation). The details of the LDT were explained prior to script
learning. Therefore, the lexical measure of activation always
preceded script performance or observation in this experiment.
Following Goschke and Kuhl's procedure, instructions regarding
which script of a given pair was to be performed by the participant
(or by the experimenter) were given immediately prior to the LDT.
In terms of initial learning, participants saw the two scripts in
each block twice on the computer screen. The script title was
shown for 10 s, and then each of the five action phrases was shown
sequentially for 10 s. Previous phrases remained on the screen such
that the title appeared for a total of 60 s by the time the last action
phrase was shown. The entire script remained on the monitor for an
additional 30 s, making the entire learning sequence 1 min 30 s.
Both scripts were shown in this fashion, and then the entire
sequence was repeated to constitute a second learning trial (for a
total learning time of 6 min). Participants were then required to
recall the two scripts by writing down on paper the sequence of
action phrases, word for word, in the order they had learned them.
If recall was not perfect, the participant went through another
learning trial for each script and again attempted recall (this was
only necessary for 2 participants). Immediately after successful
script recall, a three-digit number appeared on the monitor, and
participants were instructed to count backward by threes for 45 s,
starting from that three-digit number. After counting, the computer
beeped, and participants were given instructions specifying which
of the two scripts was to be performed (or observed) and which was
not to be executed (i.e., was neutral). The prospective instruction
was displayed on the monitor for 3 s with either the message You
will perform or the message You will observe followed by the
assigned script title. The neutral script title paired with the
prospective script was preceded by the instruction You will not
perform or You will not observe. These instructions were displayed
simultaneously in the center of the screen with the prospective
instruction appearing above the neutral instruction.
2
Immediately after presentation of these instructions, participants
engaged in the LDT. A warning tone signaled the start of the task,
and participants had been previously instructed to respond "yes" if
the letter string they saw was a legal English word and "no" if it
was not by pressing one of two keys on the computer's keyboard. A
500-ms warning tone and fixation point preceded each item's
presentation in the center of the monitor. The item disappeared
when the participant responded and was followed by an intertrial
interval (ITI) of 200 ms. People had been instructed previously to
respond as quickly and accurately as they could. On completion of
the LDT, participants were instructed either to perform or to
observe the designated script, without any reference being made as
to which script was to be performed or observed. Materials for the
1 These prospective instructions to perform or to observe were
not accompanied by any particular indication of whether the
experimenter would cue the participant or whether the participant
would have to engage in self-initiated processing to remember to
perform or to observe. Technically speaking, the intention to
perform may be a prospective memory only if participants believe
they will later have to engage in self-initiated processing to carry
out the task. Because we do not know exactly what our participants
believed, this fact may limit our ability to generalize our results
concerning intention memory to theories of prospective memory.
This point is an important one, and one to which we return in the
General Discussion section.
2 We recognize that the order of these instructions was not
counterbalanced, which meant that the prospective instruction was
always read first. We cannot fathom how that would produce the
particular pattern of obtained results, and additionally we would
argue that a single instruction about one script (e.g., the prospective-
perform or prospective-observe script) should have the same effect.ACTIVATION OF INTENTIONS 353
scripts were arranged on tables behind the computer workstation.
There were 3 participants who either forgot which script was to be
performed or who performed the script sequence incorrectly, and
they were replaced.
3 After participants completed lexical decision
in the second block of the experiment, and after they completed
script performance (or observation), we administered the final
recognition test, which required discrimination of script words
from lure items. The physical aspects of the test sequence
comprising the warning tone, fixation point, stimulus termination,
and m were identical to those of the LDT.
These procedures constituted our attempt to replicate Goschke
and Kurd's (1993) original paradigm. Therefore, our method was
identical except in the following respects. First, we used lexical-
decision latency, whereas they used recognition latency. Second,
our script materials were different but were composed of common,
everyday objects. Third, we required criterion learning as assessed
by written free recall. Fourth, our prospective instruction took 3 s,
rather than 2 s, because we added the phrases You will execute and
You will not execute (and similar phrases for observation) in front
of the script titles.
Table 1
Overall Response Latency (in Milliseconds) for Script
Words, Nonscript Words, and Nonwords in the
Lexical-Decision Tasks for Experiments 1-4
Experiment
Experiment 1
M
SE
Experiment 2
M
SE
Experiment 3
M
SE
Experiment 4
M
SE
Script
656.3
23.3
584.3
21.5
575.6
10.8
587.7
17.8
Item class
Nonscript
731.7
27.8
643.1
25.4
623.9
11.0
640.4
18.8
Nonword
835.0
33.1
759.8
36.9
693.8
17.6
729.2
24.6
Results and Discussion
Unless otherwise noted, all statistical results in this article
are significant below the .05 level. When specific contrasts
are reported, the error term reflects the data from the specific
conditions of interest. The lexical-decision results are re-
ported first, followed by the results of the final recognition
test. In this experiment and those that follow, trials reflecting
incorrect responses or latencies beyond 3 SDs of a given
participant's mean were excluded from the statistical analy-
ses. In mis experiment, 3.9% of the lexical decisions were
incorrect, and an additional 0.8% were eliminated because
of the length of the response (i.e., because they were
outliers).
Lexical decision. Pooling over the two LDTs, the first
two rows of data in Table 1 set forth the overall latency for
the three classes of items. An orderly pattern was obtained in
which script words were responded to most quickly, fol-
lowed in order by nonscript words and by nonwords which
exhibited the slowest latencies. In a within-subjects one-
factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three levels
specifying the classes of items, the means differed signifi-
cantly, F(2, 46) = 55.4, MSE = 3,488.3. Simple contrasts
confirmed that the response latency for nonscript words
differed from the latencies for both the script words, f (23) =
7.2, and the nonwords, f(23) = 5.4. We applied the standard
assumption that faster latencies reflect more activation and
therefore we conclude that script words possessed the most
activation because they had been studied previously during
the learning phase of the experiment.
Among the four scripts, latency differed as a function of
the type of prospective instruction delivered after script
learning. Figure 1 displays the results. In a 2 X 2 ANOVA
with the variables of script type (neutral vs. prospective) and
instruction (observe vs. perform), there was neither an
overall difference between the script pairs assigned to die
prospective-perform or the prospective-observe conditions,
F(l, 23) < 1.0, nor an overall difference between the two
prospective scripts combined as compared with their paired
neutral scripts, F(l, 23) = 2.6,/? > .10. These two variables,
however, did reliably interact, F(l,23) = 4.4, MSE =
3,251.7. As can be seen in Figure 1, latency for the
components of the prospective-observe script did not differ
from latency for the components of its neutral mate, whereas
responses to words from the prospective-perform script were
faster as compared with words from its neutral mate. Thus,
establishing the intention to perform an action later made the
components of that action more activated relative to neutral
materials in memory about which no intention to perform (or
to observe) had been established. This difference in the
prospective-perform condition was significant by simple
contrast to its neutral mate as well, f(23) = 2.7.
These results with lexical decision wholly replicated
Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) finding with recognition latency.
As in that earlier study, the 40-ms difference observed in the
prospective-perform condition may reflect both activation of
the script to be performed and an inhibition of the neutral
script with which it was paired. Simple analyses of the
prospective-perform's neutral script showed that these items
did not reliably differ from either of the scripts in the
observation condition, f(23)s < 1.0. Therefore, the intention
to perform a script may serve to heighten its activation and
3 These participants were replaced because we felt that the time
between learning and performance was very short (on the order of 3
min). In addition, participants learned the scripts to criterion before
they were told which to perform (or to observe). Therefore,
inability to perform the script as learned, or worse, forgetting the
instruction that was given 3 min earlier would seem to indicate
exceptionally poor memory performance, or perhaps that these
participants did not read the prospective instructions that had
appeared for 3 s. The decision to replace these participants might
have biased the results in favor of finding heightened activation
because we eliminated participants on the basis of performance of
the prospective-perform script (i.e., there was no corresponding
rationale to replace participants on the basis of the neutral or
prospective-observe materials). However, the same results were
obtained when these participants were retained as when they were
replaced, and we decided in favor of the latter.354 MARSH, HICKS, AND BINK
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Figure 1. Latency for prospective and neutral scripts in Experi-
ment 1 when the lexical-decision-task (LDT) measurement of
activation occurred before performance or observation.
inhibit its neutral mate, but the intention to observe neither
heightens nor inhibits the associated memorial records.
Recognition. The recognition test was administered af-
ter the prospective-perform (or observe) task was completed
in the second block of the experiment. If an intention is
deactivated after its completion, then response latencies to
the four types'of script might be expected to show compa-
rable levels of activation as measured by recognition latency
(i.e., Goschke & Kuhl's, 1993, dependent measure). The
results are set forth as the first four rows of data in Table 2.
These data reflect the 97.2% of the trials on which a correct
recognition decision was given. In a 2 X 2 ANOVA using the
same variables as were used for lexical decision, prospective
(perform and observe) scripts did not differ from the neutral
scripts with which they were paired, F(l,23) < 1. The
interesting result, which was quite unexpected, was that
responses to the items from the prospective-perform scripts
and their neutral partners were marginally slower (by about
Table 2
Overall Recognition Latencies (in Milliseconds)
in Experiment 1
Experiment and script
Experimental
Perform
Perform's neutral
Observe
Observe's neutral
Additional control
Perform
Perform's neutral
Observe
Observe's neutral
M
830.8
836.4
802.3
806.9
908.4
913.5
890.0
883.3
SE
31.6
31.1
30.3
30.8
39.1
49.5
37.8
38.6
30 ms) than were responses to the items from the prospective-
observe scripts and their neutral partners, F(l, 23) = 3.2,
p = .08, MSE = 6,402.8. If this effect were genuine, then it
could be interpreted as some evidence for the inhibition of
intentions after they have been completed (i.e., physically
carried out). Why the neutral script would likewise be
inhibited is entirely unclear. There was no interaction, F(l,
23) <1.
In constructing the LDT, nonscript items were included so
that the lures in the recognition test would also have been
experienced in the LDT portion of the experiment. The
interpretation of these recognition latencies is slightly ob-
scured by the fact that the items had been tested earlier in the
LDT. Previous work that specifically tested the effect on
subsequent recognition of taking an LDT showed that there
was no influence whatsoever of the preceding LDT on
recognition accuracy (MacLeod, 1989; see also Marsh &
Landau, 1995, for a similar argument using a recall task
rather than recognition). Nevertheless, the potential impor-
tance of the finding that memories of completed tasks may
be inhibited relative to memories that had no previous
intentional status led us to conduct an additional control
condition. In that condition, the procedure was identical to
that of this experiment except that all valid words in the LDT
were neutral (i.e., none of the script words were included).
Therefore, the recognition latencies in this control condition
were free from any sort of influence that might have arisen
from their earlier appearance in the LDT. These data are
reported for what they are: a post-hoc exploration conducted
in a different academic term from the one reported as
Experiment 1. These control data are also set forth in Table
2. As can be seen there, once again, items comprising
completed intentions to perform were recognized slightly
more slowly (by about 20 ms) than items contained in scripts
that had been observed. However, that difference was
smaller and not reliable, F( 1,23) = 1.3, p > .2. Although the
evidence is currently equivocal, completed intentions may
have undergone some sort of inhibition relative to memories
that had no intentional status. Why the neutral script
associated with the perform script was also slower is unclear.
Having been learned together, perhaps they were treated as a
pair, along the lines of our instructions to participants. This
possibility that completed activities undergo inhibition was
explored more directly in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that Goschke
and Kuhl's (1993) intention-superiority effect could be
obtained reliably with a different measure of item activation.
In Experiment 1, memories related to an activity that was
subsequently going to be performed were reliably faster than
memories that had no such intentional status. As in Goschke
and Kuhl's report, intentions not related to performance (i.e.,
the observe scripts) did not appear to have this privileged
status in memory. The intention-superiority effect, however,
may not be driven completely by the activation of intentions
to be performed; it may also be a consequence of the
inhibition of other memories. In Experiment 1, the onlyACTIVATION OF INTENTIONS 355
other memories that were tested were the components of the
neutral script. If inhibition existed, then the results of the
recognition test in Experiment 1 are suggestive that activi-
ties, once completed, might undergo the same sort of
inhibition. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test this
hypothesis directly by moving the measurement of activa-
tion from before performance (or observation) to after
performance of the prospective scripts. If prospective-
perform scripts undergo inhibition, or deactivation, after
they are performed, then latency to its constituents in the
LDT should be slower than to the constituents of its neutral
partner. The prediction is ambiguous for the prospective-
observe script and its neutral partner, but in four experi-
ments, Goschke and Kuhl never found significant differ-
ences between their observed scripts and their neutral
partners. Their results suggest that no differences should
materialize with instructions to observe.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates from the University
of Georgia volunteered in exchange for course credit. None had
served in Experiment 1.
Materials and procedure. The materials were identical to those
of Experiment 1, as was the general procedure. The four scripts
were completely counterbalanced so that each one served an equal
number of times under all manipulations. Half of the participants
performed a script in the first block and observed in the second
block. The order was reversed for the remaining half of the
participants. The successful learning of a pair of scripts was
followed by the backward-counting task for 45 s. The prospective-
perform (or prospective-observe) instruction was given, followed
by the participant actually performing (or observing) the appropri-
ate sequence of actions. On average, it took participants approxi-
mately 1 min to leave their seats to perform (or to observe) the
script, and to return to the computer work station. The LDT
followed immediately after the prospective task had been com-
pleted or observed. People had been previously instructed in how to
make lexical decisions. Composition of items in the LDT was
identical to that in Experiment 1 (i.e., script words, nonscript
words, and nonwords). The sequence was repeated in the second
block for the prospective task (either to observe or to perform) that
was not undertaken in the first block. Because of the small latency
differences in Experiment 1, recognition tests were not adminis-
tered in this experiment or in the ones that followed.
Results and Discussion
In lexical decision, 4.6% of the total number of trials
contained an erroneous response, and 1.3% were eliminated
through their identification as outlying responses.
4 Overall
latency for the three classes of items in Experiment 2 is
displayed in Table 1. As was expected, script words were
responded to more quickly than were nonscript items, and
nonwords were identified the most slowly, F(2, 46) = 62.2,
MSE = 3,080.2. By simple contrast, as before, nonscript
words were slower than items learned in the script, t(23) =
6.1, but were identified more quickly than nonwords,
r(23) = 7.6. This pattern of results turned out just as it
should have if lexical decision measures item activation.
The critical results are set forth in Figure 2. The important
640
540
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Figure 2. Latency for prospective and neutral scripts in Experi-
ment 2 when the lexical-decision-task (LDT) measurement of
activation occurred after performance or observation.
outcome was an interaction in the 2 X 2 ANO VA demonstrat-
ing that latency for the prospective-perform script was much
longer after it had been completed as compared with the
remaining scripts tested in this experiment, F(l, 23) = 5.1,
MSE = 2,873.5. Therefore, measuring activation after the
completion of an intention suggests that inhibitory mecha-
nisms may constitute an important component of the inten-
tion-superiority effect, as originally speculated by Goschke
and Kuhl (1993). A main effect was observed in the
comparison of the two prospective scripts with the two
neutral scripts. This effect was driven by the much slower
latencies for the components of the prospective-perform
script, F(l, 23) = 5.7, MSE = 2,569.1. The simple compari-
son of the perform script and its neutral partner was reliable
as well, f(23) = 2.9. As is evident from Figure 2, there was
no inhibition, following completion of the observe instruc-
tion, for perform scripts as compared with their neutral
partners, f (23) < 1.
These results are somewhat striking considering that
people tested in this experiment either had just worked with
the props or had watched the experimenter work with them.
One a priori prediction that could have been made was that
test items from the prospective (perform and observe) scripts
should have been identified more quickly in the LDT
because of their recent exposure. Stated slightly differently,
the prospective test items had been encountered twice, once
4 Overall latencies in Experiments 2-4 are about 60-80 ms faster
than in Experiment 1. Why this occurred is unclear; perhaps it is a
result of having used slightly different participant populations
tested at different times of the year. Because the comparisons of
interest are confined within each experiment, we did not pursue this
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during learning and again when people mentally rehearsed
the scripts to perform them correctly or to identify whether
the experimenter had performed the tasks correctly. We were
originally quite concerned about this possibility because it
might have weakened any observation of inhibition in this
experiment. Rather than having quicker response times as
might be predicted from this priming standpoint, people
were universally slower to respond to the items that came
from the tasks they had completed themselves. This consid-
eration does raise the important question of whether the
inhibition effect would have been larger if the intention's
status could have been fulfilled (i.e., completed) in some
way other than working with the props that the scripts had
specified.
The foregoing argument also makes it rather implausible
that what is being labeled inhibition here is merely a
function of the time between encoding and the assessment of
activation. Obviously, the delay is slightly longer between
study and test in this experiment as compared with Experi-
ment 1. Because of counterbalancing, that latency was, on
average, the same for both the prospective script and its
neutral partner at the time when the LDT was undertaken
(i.e., approximately 1 min). For the results to be a function of
time, the corresponding inhibition effects should have been
observed in the prospective-observe script, which did not
occur. That is, differential decay in the prospective-perform
and perspective-observe scripts cannot explain the pattern of
results obtained in this experiment, especially in light of the
greater priming that would be expected to have accrued from
working with items as opposed to watching the experimenter
work with them. The results of Experiment 3, to which we
now turn, also contravene a simple decay interpretation.
Experiment 3
Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that
intentions about performed actions that are, as yet, uncom-
pleted may have a privileged status in memory in terms of
their accessibility. Intentions related to performance that
have been completed appear to undergo deactivation, or
inhibition, relative to the remaining neutral contents of
memory. In Experiment 1, activation of the components of
prospective-perform and perspective-observe scripts was
measured prior to script completion, whereas in Experiment
2, that measurement occurred after completion. Assuming
that each of the two blocks of the experiment was fairly
independent, as was emphasized to the participants, the
purpose of Experiment 3 was to replicate the major findings
of Experiments 1 and 2 by using a within-subjects manipula-
tion of when activation was measured. On the basis of
Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) findings and our own that the
prospective-observe script is less sensitive to experimental
manipulations, it was replaced in Experiment 3 with a
second prospective-perform script.
5 Thus, each participant
in this next experiment learned two pairs of scripts and
actually had to perform one script from each pair. For one
pair, lexical decision preceded performance, and for the
second pair, lexical decision followed performance of the
script. If the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are robust and
genuine, then the straightforward prediction is that a cross-
over interaction should be obtained in which greater activa-
tion should be found when lexical decision precedes fulfill-
ment of the intention to perform the script and less activation
should be found when lexical decision follows it (relative to
the neutral script partners).
Method
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduates volunteered in ex-
change for partial course credit. Three of these people were
replacements for individuals who did not follow directions or who
could not perform the scripts perfectly (see footnote 3). None had
participated in the previous experiments.
Materials and procedure. The procedure was identical to that
of the preceding two experiments with the following exceptions.
People were told that they would learn two pairs of scripts and
would be asked to perform from memory one script from each pair.
Complete counterbalancing ensured that each script was observed
as the prospective and the neutral script in both the first and second
blocks and ensured that which script in the pair was learned first
was counterbalanced, just as in Experiments 1 and 2. Half of the
participants received the LDT prior to performance in the first
block and after performance in the second block. The order was
reversed for the remaining people. The composition of the LDT
was identical to that of the LDTs in the earlier two experiments,
with 10 words from each script, 10 nonscript words matched for
frequency and length, and 20 nonwords for each script. Thus, there
were 80 critical items in each of the two LDTs, with 12 buffer items
(6 words and 6 nonwords) preceding the test sequence. All other
aspects of the instructions and testing were identical in detail and
timing to those reported for Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Inaccurate responses, which comprised only 3.4% of the
trials, were eliminated. Of the remaining trials, 1.6% were
determined to be outliers and were eliminated from the
analyses. As in the previous experiments, the overall speed
for the three classes of items followed an orderly progres-
sion in which people were slowest with nonwords, were
faster with neutral but valid English words (i.e., nonscript
words), and were fastest with the script items, F(2, 62) =
57.0, MSE = 1,985.0. The means are set forth in Table 1. By
simple contrast, the nonscript items were responded to more
slowly than the script items, f(31) = 13.7, but were
responded to more quickly than the nonwords, t(31) — 5.2.
The critical outcome is displayed in Figure 3. As is readily
seen in that figure, a crossover interaction in response
latency was obtained, F(l, 31) = 13.7, MSE = 1,841.1. The
left pair of bars in Figure 3 depicts latency for the
components of the prospective-perform script when it was
assessed before fulfilling the intention. The right pair of bars
depicts latency after fulfilling the intention. Simple compari-
5 In Goschke and Kuhl's (1993, 1996) reports, they stressed the
importance of this result for performance versus observation. We
have chosen not to review their theories concerning action control
(for the sake of brevity), but we did want to acknowledge this
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Figure 3. Latency for prospective and neutral scripts in Experi-
ment 3 when the lexical-decision-task (LDT) measurement of
activation occurred before and after performance.
sons relative to its neutral partner confirmed that latency was
faster for the prospective script items before performance
(left bars in Figure 3), *(31) = 2.7, and was slower after
performance (right bars), f(31) = 3.0. This pattern of results
would be expected if the intention-superiority effect reflects
both heightened activation of an uncompleted intention and
deactivation of a completed intention relative to more
neutral contents in memory. This inhibitory effect is a novel
finding that has now been replicated a second time.
Given the nature of the significant interaction, neither of
the main effects in the preceding analysis was statistically
significant. There was no evidence that the components of
the two prospective-perform scripts were any faster than
those of the two neutral scripts, F(l, 31) < 1.0. Overall
response latency also did not differ as a function of testing
prior to or after completion of the intention, F(l, 31) < 1.0.
With respect to this second null outcome, the two scripts
tested after completion might have been predicted to have an
overall lower level of activation (i.e., longer latencies) as
compared with the pair tested prior to completion (on the
basis of the results of Experiment 1). This did not occur. As a
consequence, the slower latency for the script that had been
performed when lexical decision followed completion neces-
sarily meant that the latency for the neutral script in that
tested-after condition was about as fast as the to-be-
performed script in the tested-before condition. However,
the same pattern of results was found in a between-subjects
analysis of just the first block of trials. Thus, counterbalanc-
ing within subjects which assessment of activation came first
(i.e., before vs. after performance) did not lead to any sort of
differential carryover effects that might arise from using a
repeated measures experimental design.
One interpretation of this pattern of results is that as in
Anderson's (1983) ACT* model of memory, overall level of
activation for items in memory at any given time is fairly
constant. Therefore, measurement of activation yields a
relative measure at the time it is taken. In Anderson's model,
the fixed and asymptotic amount of activation is assumed to
be distributed unevenly among the concepts that are acti-
vated in working memory (p. 94). This view is consistent
both with the interpretation that the intention-superiority
effect is a function of activation and inhibition and with the
interpretation that people approached the two pairs of scripts
in each block of the experiment fairly independently.
Moreover, in Anderson's model, goal nodes that have been
achieved are popped (i.e., shut off) from the stack, and this
process accounts for changes in focused attention (p. 33).
Once popped, a source node's activation decays rapidly (p.
29). The inhibitory effect found in Experiments 2 and 3 is
entirely consistent with this model.
Although we return to this notion in the General Discus-
sion section, we do note now that this interpretation is
consistent with our intuitions about how people normally
shift their attention from task to task throughout the day. Our
intuition is that after people complete one task, their
attention is directed toward making a decision about which
of several tasks will be completed next. According to this
account, having completed an activity, the neutral script with
which it was paired may automatically receive some activa-
tion as a candidate for completion. Although we have no
evidence for this intuition, we raise this possible link
between this laboratory task and more naturally occurring
prospective memory because it is entirely consistent with
Anderson's (1983) account and may represent a point of
departure for other researchers who wish to pursue it.
6
Experiment 4
The manipulations in Experiments 1-3 measured activa-
tion at different points in time. In Experiments 1 and 3,
measurement between the establishment of an intention and
its fulfillment suggested that memories related to intentions
about prospective performance were more available (i.e.,
more activated relative to neutral material). In Experiments
2 and 3, measurement after the fulfillment of a previously
established intention suggested that memories related to
these completed activities were less available (i.e., deacti-
vated or inhibited relative to neutral material). One of the
only other times that activation could be assessed in this
paradigm was during the completion of an intention. Inter-
rupting people in the middle of a task to assess the level of
activation of that script and its neutral mate constitutes a
Zeigarnik manipulation. The Zeigamik effect is the experi-
mental result that people have better memories, on average,
for tasks that they have not yet fully completed as compared
with tasks that they have completed. In a typical Zeigarnik
experiment, people are asked to perform 10 or more simple
activities (e.g., solving mathematical problems). On half of
these tasks, they are interrupted and are not allowed to
complete them. Later, when asked to write down all of the
6 We wish to thank Steve Lindsay for suggesting this possibility
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tasks they had engaged in, people generally remember more
of the tasks that were interrupted as compared with the ones
they were allowed to complete.
The theoretical and empirical work on the Zeigarnik effect
is a tangled web of conflicting reports (Butterfield, 1964;
Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), and therefore, a detailed treatment
is beyond the scope of this article. The general result for
completed tasks, however, is similar in kind to the inhibition
effects obtained in Experiments 2 and 3 after the scripts had
been completed. In those two experiments, memories for a
completed intention were less available. Likewise in the
Zeigarnik effect, memories for completed activities were
less available as evidenced by their poorer recall. If these
similarities are genuine, even at a very general level, then
several predictions can be made for the paradigm adopted in
Experiments 1-3. First, an interrupted task should show
heightened activation relative to a neutral mate because the
intention has yet to be fulfilled (i.e., it is still a prospective
activity). Second, and on the one hand, the completed
portion of an interrupted activity could show some inhibition
relative to the uncompleted portion if inhibition operates at
the component level of multistage activities. On the other
hand, if deactivation occurs as a function of completing the
entire activity, then both the completed and the uncompleted
components could be relatively available as compared with
neutral memories that have no intentionality associated with
them. Third, the deactivation seen in Experiments 2 and 3
should be observed again in a within-subjects design in
which one script is interrupted and the other is allowed to be
completed before the assessment of its activation. These
specific hypotheses were tested in Experiment 4.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four people from the same pool as in
Experiments 1-3 participated in exchange for course credit. None
had participated before. Two people were replaced for performing
the script incorrectly (see footnote 3).
Materials and procedure. The materials had to be updated for
this experiment. In Experiments 1-3, each script comprised five
action sequences. In this experiment, a sixth action was added so
that the participants could be interrupted directly after performing
the third action in each script. Because comparisons were going to
be made for the first half against the second half of each script,
word frequency and syllabic length were equated across this
variable for the four scripts. For each pair of scripts, the 4 new
words were added to the LDT, as were 4 new valid, neutral English
words (i.e., nonscript words), and 8 nonwords. Thus, rather than 80
critical items on each of the two LDTs, there were 96 in this
experiment. All other aspects of the materials and testing remained
unchanged.
People were instructed that they would learn two separate pairs
of scripted actions and that they would be required to perform one
script in each pair (i.e., the same instructions used in Experiment
3). Thus, each prospective script was one that was to be performed.
The prospective-observe condition was not tested, just as it was not
tested in Experiment 3. As in Experiments 1-3, instructions for
making lexical decisions were given before participants learned the
first pair of scripts. Learning time was increased by 10 s when a
script was presented on the computer because of the sixth activity
that was added in this experiment. Complete counterbalancing
ensured mat each script was observed in all prospective and neutral
conditions, for completed and interrupted scripts, and across
location and block of the experiment. Likewise, half of the
participants were interrupted in the first block and half were
interrupted in the second block. The experimenter interrupted each
participant directly after the third component of the to-be-
interrupted script with the following: "Wait! I have made a
mistake. You were supposed to do the decision task on the
computer first. You can finish that later." This verbal instruction
should have caused people to form the intention to complete the
task later At this point, the experimenter immediately led the
participant back to the computer, and the LDT was administered by
the experimental software. After lexical decision, the participant
finished performing the script. If the script was uninterrupted, then
the participant was allowed to complete the activity in its entirety
before the LDT was administered.
Results and Discussion
On average, 3.8% of the lexical-decision trials were
eliminated because of incorrect responses. Of the remaining
trials, 1.3% were classified as outliers and eliminated from
the analyses. Latency for each class of items reliably
replicated latencies for Experiments 1-3, as set forth in the
last two rows of data in Table 1. Participants responded
fastest to script items, more slowly to nonscript items, and
slowest to nonwords, F(2, 46) = 51.2, MSE = 2,398.8. The
simple contrasts between nonscript and script items, t(23) =
8.3, and nonscript words and nonwords, ?(23) = 5.0, were
statistically significant.
Latency for the script items is depicted in Figure 4. As in
Experiment 3, there was a significant crossover interaction
among the experimental conditions, F(l, 23) = 8.2, MSE =
1,633.7. When the script was uninterrupted and was com-
pleted before the assessment of activation (the two right
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Figure 4. Latency for prospective and neutral scripts in Experi-
ment 4 when the lexical-decision-task (LDT) measurement of
activation occurred in the middle of or after performance.ACTIVATION OF INTENTIONS 359
hand bars of Figure 4), the components of the prospective
script were less available than the components of the neutral
script about which no intention to perform had been made,
f(23) = 2.1. These results wholly replicated those of
Experiments 2 and 3. In contrast, when the script was
interrupted in the middle of its execution (the two left hand
bars of Figure 4), the components of those prospective
scripts were more available than those belonging to the
neutral scripts with which they had been paired, f(23) = 2.0.
Interestingly, in the interrupted condition, there was no
difference in people's speed for items from the portion of the
activity they had already completed (574.9 ms) as compared
with items they had yet to perform (574.4 ms), f(23) < 1.0.
Therefore, for the interrupted script as a whole, the pattern of
results was similar to the assessment of activation before
fulfilling the intention as tested in Experiments 1 and 3.
These results suggest that an interrupted activity, like an
uncompleted one, may have some privileged availability in
memory. In addition, all components of that script, not just
the ones that had yet to be completed, were more available
than those of the neutral script. Some anecdotal evidence is
relevant to that claim. The experimenter who collected the
data reported that after making lexical decisions in the
interrupted condition, participants occasionally would ver-
bally repeat the first three actions in order to pick up
correctly where they had left off. Therefore, people who
were interrupted may have needed to keep all components of
the intention activated in order to complete it successfully
later. We now consider what the results of this experiment,
and of Experiments 1-3, imply for the formation and
completion of an intention.
General Discussion
In Experiments 1-4, participants learned pairs of distinct,
simple scripts that consisted of a sequence of actions. At the
time the scripts were learned, people did not know which
script they would have to perform and which they would
have to observe. In Experiments 1 and 3, people who were
told that they would have to carry out one of the scripts
displayed shorter lexical-decision latencies for that script as
compared with the neutral script about which no action-
associated intention had been formed. Therefore, Goschke
and Kuhl's (1993) four experiments with recognition latency
have now been replicated twice. Experiment 4 extended
these predictions to a case in which an activity was only
partially completed. As measured by lexical decision, inter-
rupted and uncompleted intentions also have a heightened
accessibility, presumably because of their status as being
still prospective in nature. These results support the impor-
tant notion that the intentional component of prospective
memories may have some privileged status in declarative
memory.
The interpretation of these results suggests that the
declarative representation of an intention might have ac-
crued heightened activation from the instruction to perform
the script. On completing the intention, we reasoned that
there would be no need for that representation to continue to
exhibit any privileged status in memory. In Experiments
2-4, people completed the activity as prescribed in the
instructions and then engaged in lexical decision. In these
three experiments, latency for the constituents of the prospec-
tive-perform scripts was reliably slower than for the constitu-
ents of the neutral scripts. Applying the standard interpreta-
tion that activation is inversely related to response latency,
those results suggest that after performing an activity, the
constituents either rapidly lose activation (i.e., decay) or are
actively inhibited. There is some generality to these claims
as shown by the fact that the between-subjects effects across
Experiments 1 and 2 held when precompletion and post-
completion was tested within subjects in Experiment 3.
From a theoretical standpoint, our results may generalize
only to the memorial status of intentions (or intended
activities) and not more generally to theories of prospective
memory. Limited generalization stems from the fact that we
do not know whether participants expected to be cued by the
experimenter to perform the script (see footnote I). If they
did, then the intentions we have studied in this article are
somewhat different than the intentions that form the declara-
tive portion of a real prospective memory. These latter
intentions may be associated with a level of self-initiated
cuing that the intentions we have studied might lack.
Perhaps intentions that people establish for themselves
enjoy even greater availability. Having raised this caveat,
these results may still have some bearing on how people
might accomplish the intentions that they do establish for
themselves. For example, time-based intentions are ones that
have no external cue and may require a great deal of
self-initiated processing to carry out the task successfully
(Craik, 1986; but see Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson,
Guynn, & Cunfer, 1995). If the declarative representation of
an intention has some heightened activation, then it may
come to mind more easily or more frequently, thereby
increasing the probability that a time-based task is accom-
plished. For event-based intentions, Mantyla (1996) spoke
of "retrieval sensitivity" (p. 93) in which planning and task
monitoring increase the probability that an event will be
noticed and that the prospective intentionality about the
event will be recalled. As discussed in our introduction, his
positive findings with priming a prospective response are
consistent with this notion of heightened accessibility.
Goschke and Kuhl (1993) interpreted their findings in
terms of Anderson's (1983) ACT* model of memory. As
mentioned earlier in the Results and Discussion section of
Experiment 3, the results from these four experiments are
entirely consistent with that model. Assuming that the
amount of activation at any given time is fairly constant,
measuring the activation of prospective memories and more
neutral materials yields a relative measure. Thus, our data
suggest that intentions that have not yet been fulfilled are
more available than neutral materials. Likewise, the relative
measure suggests that completed intentions are less avail-
able than neutral materials. Of course, the argument could be
made that neutral materials have received heightened activa-
tion following completion of an intention, or that neutral
materials are inhibited prior to completing an intention.
Such an argument is simply the other side of the same coin
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the differences in results across Experiments 1-4 is best
accomplished with respect to what changed across those
experiments. Presumably, intentionality with respect to the
neutral materials did not change, whereas intentionality for
the prospective-perform scripts did. Most importantly, the
intentionality associated with the prospective-perform scripts
changed as a function of whether people had completed
them.
Although we have framed our results in terms of activa-
tion and inhibition, these concepts could be theoretically
side-stepped to some degree by appealing to the revival rate
of a memory trace when it is encountered again, as portrayed
in the source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi,
& Lindsay, 1993). Viewing the intention-superiority effect
as a consequence of differences in the rates of revival of
memory traces may be fruitful because people contend with
many intentions, activating and deactivating them through-
out the day. The claim that all of these intentions possess a
heightened level of activation might be somewhat unrealis-
tic. To claim that they are later reprocessed more quickly or
more efficiently would allow an explanation for why people
are adept at both time-based and event-based prospective
memory tasks. This revival account is suggested only as an
alternative conceptualization and in no way contravenes an
account based solely on heightened activation or on a
combination of both activation and inhibition.
This discussion does raise, however, the general issue of
the type of intention that is being studied in this paradigm.
The scripts were short sequences of actions, the assessment
of activation lasted but a few minutes (approximately three),
and then the intention was fulfilled which took but a minute
itself. Longer term intentions (e.g., to write a manuscript)
may not display the same sort of privileged status, or
perhaps they display an accentuated degree of quick process-
ing because they have been processed and reprocessed so
many times in the past. In a similar way, the scripts that were
tested were originally learned to criterion, such that the order
of the constituents was unambiguous and fixed. When
someone forms an intention, say to pick up some milk and
some dry cleaning after work, it is unclear just how detailed
that intention may be. For example, does one explicitly plan
whether the milk will be purchased before the trip to the
cleaners? These issues are not raised necessarily as criti-
cisms, but as considerations for researchers who want to
pursue the intention-superiority effect. If the effects of word
frequency and other factors could be controlled for in lexical
decision, perhaps there would be a way to test people's
intentions that they have established for themselves (e.g.,
Marsh, Hicks, & Landau, in press).
We claimed earlier that the slower latencies of completed
activities might reflect inhibition. There is no way empiri-
cally to distinguish active inhibition of a memory trace from
the claim that a faster decay rate is responsible for the slower
latencies. Theoretically, however, it may make sense to
interpret the effect as inhibition. In theories of action control,
people need to be able to deactivate information in working
memory to focus sustained attention on a current task. In
Norman and Shallice's (1986) model of central executive
functioning, current tasks are handled by the firing of action
schemas. The firing of one action schema causes lateral
inhibition of other activated materials similar to the effects
observed in the crossover interactions in the present Experi-
ments 3 and 4 (cf. Shallice & Burgess, 1991). Similarly, in
Anderson's (1983) ACT* model, current tasks are carried
out by the firing of procedural production rules. In both
theories, the contents of working memory are matched to
stored preexisting conditions that, once fired, guide behav-
ioral responses. It would be adaptive upon finishing an
activity to be able to inhibit the conditions that led to a
certain response in order to avoid repeating it.
There is abundant evidence in the field of perception for
inhibitory mechanisms at the very lowest levels of automatic
actions. For example, in the phenomenon of inhibition of
return, latency is slower for processing a stimulus that is
located in the same position as it was on the previous trial as
compared with a stimulus that appears in a new location
(Kwak & Egeth, 1992; Tipper, Driver, & Weaver, 1991). The
interpretation of this phenomenon is that it is adaptive in
terms of the amount of information obtained from the visual
field if resampling the same location is actively avoided (i.e.,
inhibited). Thus, it would be adaptive in terms of higher
order cognitive processing to do a similar thing. Inhibiting a
completed response would avoid its repetition.
To the extent that the intention-superiority effect reflects
both an activation of declarative representations related to
intentions and an inhibition of more neutral declarative
memories, the exact cognitive mechanisms have yet to be
specified. In our own work, we have considered the impor-
tance of attentional mechanisms and central executive
resources to prospective remembering (Marsh & Hicks,
1998; see also Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, & Shaw, 1997).
Taxing central executive resources, as opposed to more
peripheral systems such as the articulatory loop, led to
prospective performance deficits in event-based tasks that
required a response to be made to external cues. Perhaps as
an intention is formed, it is placed into a heightened state of
activity, or perhaps it is marked in some way for later
processing or in a way that facilitates that later processing
(Kuhl & Kazen-Saad, 1988). As discussed earlier, facilitated
processing may result in faster memorial revival rates. There
is some neuropsychological evidence that the formation of
an intention is a functionally different form of encoding as
evidenced by additional frontal lobe activity (Shallice &
Burgess, 1991). As more is learned about executive function-
ing, perhaps the adaptive aspects of the cognitive system that
support prospective memory can be assigned more defini-
tively to the declarative-encoding phase versus the retrieval
stage (e.g., heightened revivability) at which time an inten-
tion is actually carried out.
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